

DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN  
WILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN  
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS  
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA  
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA  
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY  
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA  
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA  
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO  
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE  
ORRIN HATCH, UTAH  
FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA  
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA  
CHIC HECHT, NEVADA  
JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

Rec'd in ER 4 Oct '88

Executive Registry

88-3794X

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

IN RESPONSE  
REFER TO: 88-3501

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO  
ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO

GEORGE TENET, STAFF DIRECTOR  
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

OCA FILE

September 28, 1988

SAIT, SSC1

The Honorable William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

As you are aware, one of the Intelligence Committee's most important and continuing responsibilities is the oversight of U.S. capabilities to monitor compliance with arms control agreements while, at the same time, fulfilling other important responsibilities. Although a START treaty will not be signed this year, and significant disagreements remain between the United States and the Soviet Union, we believe that sufficient progress has occurred in the START negotiations to warrant comprehensive attention on our part.

Enclosed is the Intelligence Committee's work schedule to keep the Committee staff currently informed and fully prepared to address START and START-related intelligence issues. The work schedule, which has benefited from discussions with your Arms Control and Intelligence Staff and other experts, is based on the Committee's experience with the INF Treaty. While that treaty was still under negotiation, the intelligence community provided the Committee staff with a series of formal, on-the-record staff briefings that served as the basis for the Committee's hearings once the treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification. These formal staff briefings were of great benefit to the Committee's deliberations, placing the Committee in a solid position to evaluate the intelligence implications of the INF Treaty.


We believe that it is particularly important that the Committee staff begin its work on a START treaty now, since the monitoring and intelligence issues surrounding such a treaty are potentially much more important and complex than

The Honorable William H. Webster  
September 28, 1988  
Page Two


those associated with the INF agreement. We therefore request that the CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) assist our Committee staff by preparing or coordinating the preparation of briefings tailored to the enclosed work schedule.

As always, we appreciate your support and remain

Sincerely yours,



David L. Boren  
Chairman



William S. Cohen  
Vice Chairman

MEMORANDUM

21 Sept 88

TO:   
FM: Gary L. Sojka  
Ed Levine

STAT

Subj: START Work Agenda

1. Enclosed is the revised START work agenda based on the inputs from players in the intelligence community who responded to our solicitation. Based on your comments, we are looking at starting the process on a weekly basis in early November.
2. Please note that we have replaced the word "session" with the terms "subject" or "subject area," although we hope the new terms will equate to sessions. Nevertheless, as you work the schedule, you may find it appropriate to reduce but more likely to increase the number of sessions to deal effectively with the subjects and issues surrounding them.
3. We wish to point out that subjects 2/3/4 of the START work agenda are gray areas. We are not really looking for the policy makers to tell us what the treaty says; rather, we are looking for a detailed description of the monitoring tasks that flow from specific treaty provisions. Therefore, we are looking to the intelligence community to give the briefs, based on its interpretation of the treaty, citing specific provisions where appropriate. If you foresee difficulties here, let us know.
4. Also please note that the START work agenda, significantly more so than the INF work plan, goes well beyond the issue of monitoring Soviet compliance with treaty provisions into the world of intelligence support to our nuclear forces in a START regime. Indeed, the number of issues to be addressed on this latter subject are as many as on the former. This is not an idiosyncratic or Committee interest only. We believe that it truly reflects how the Senate will look at a START treaty. Unlike INF, which to many members was at the margin, the Senate's evaluation of START will look heavily at its impact. Thus, we feel strongly that we must understand how START will affect intelligence support to our nuclear forces and how Soviet legal developments may affect the balance in a START environment.
5. Although some may argue that evaluating the impact of START on intelligence support to our nuclear forces is not a traditional ACIS responsibility, we believe it clearly is and thus feel comfortable requesting that you organize the briefings in this area. Indeed, we think ACIS is particularly appropriate, given its national level character, because we wish to expand the players within DOD intelligence to include both Naval Intelligence and SAC intelligence. Both organizations are aware that you may request them to brief. In addition, although they are aware its your call, they have identified areas of interest or expertise (SAC/NAVY -- I&W and nuclear security; Navy -- Soviet developments

in ASW [I'm sure OSWR will want to play also]; Navy -- the future SSBN force mix under START; SAC -- support to SIOP targeting [We're sure DIA will want to brief here too; Navy may wish to brief their SSBN adaptive targeting effort]).

6. Again, if we can be of help, please let us know.

**Page Denied**

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied

STAT

STAT